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The security of conventional cryptography systems is threatened in the forthcoming era of quan-
tum computers. Quantum key distribution (QKD) features fundamentally proven security and offers
a promising option for quantum-proof cryptography solution. Although prototype QKD systems
over optical fiber have been demonstrated over the years, the key generation rates remain several
orders-of-magnitude lower than current classical communication systems. In an effort towards a com-
mercially viable QKD system with improved key generation rates, we developed a discrete-variable
QKD system based on time-bin quantum photonic states that is capable of generating provably-
secure cryptographic keys at megabit-per-second (Mbps) rates over metropolitan distances. We use
high-dimensional quantum states that transmit more than one secret bit per received photon, allevi-
ating detector saturation effects in the superconducting nanowire single photon detectors (SNSPDs)
employed in our system that feature very high detection efficiency (of over 70%) and low timing
jitter (of less than 40 ps). Our system is constructed using commercial off-the-shelf components,
and the adopted protocol can readily be extended to free-space quantum channels. The security
analysis adopted to distill the keys ensures that the demonstrated protocol is robust against coherent
attacks, finite-size effects, and a broad class of experimental imperfections identified in our system.
Development of scalable quantum computing plat-
forms is one of the rapidly expanding areas of research
in quantum information science [1, 2]. With many com-
mercial companies working towards building these plat-
forms, a medium-scale quantum computer capable of
demonstrating quantum supremacy over classical com-
puters is in earnest only a few years away. Quantum
computers poses a serious threat to the cybersecurity
because most of the current cryptosystems, like the one
devised by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (known as the
RSA)–whose security is based on computational hardness
assumptions—can potentially be broken with a powerful
quantum computer in practical timescales [3, 4]. Quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) with symmetric encryption
is one of the very few methods that can provide provable
security against an attack aided with a quantum com-
puter [5]. However, a major limitation of most current
QKD systems is that the rate at which the secret key
is generated is orders-of-magnitude lower than the dig-
ital communication rates [6]. This limitation ultimately
prevents QKD from being useful for a wide range of com-
munication tasks.
To make QKD more relevant for widespread deploy-
ment in communication networks, there has been sig-
nificant effort to increase the key generation rate of
QKD systems, prioritizing metropolitan distances (20-
80 km) for large-scale implementation of QKD networks
[7]. One of the major breakthroughs was the develop-
ment of superconducting nano-wire single-photon detec-
tors that can detect photons with high-efficiency and yet
have low dark count rates [8]. However, these detectors
still have a recovery time greater than 10 ns [9], thereby
limiting the rate at which the secret key can be gener-
ated.
High-dimensional quantum states—qudits (dimension
d > 2) rather than qubits—provide a robust and effi-
cient platform to overcome some of the practical chal-
lenges of current QKD systems [10, 11]. The efficiency
comes from the ability to encode many bits (log2 d) of
information on a single photon. QKD systems using a
high-dimensional quantum state space relies on the same
degrees-of-freedom as the qubit-based systems. Nonethe-
less, the amount of information that can be encoded on
each photon can be large even in a realistic situation be-
cause the number of bits that can be encoded on each
photon is unbounded, scaling as log2(d).
Fundamentally, QKD systems using a high-
dimensional quantum state space have two major
advantages over the qubit-based protocols. First, they
can increase the effective key generation rate in systems
limited by the saturation of the single photon detectors,
often arising from the dead time of the detectors. The
dead time refers to the period of time over a which
a single-photon detector resets from a prior detection
event and thus remains unresponsive to an incident
photon. This becomes particularly important in the
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2limit of low channel loss, which corresponds to relatively
short distances in standard optical fiber. Second,
high-dimensional QKD systems have higher resistance
to quantum channel noise, which means these systems
can tolerate a higher quantum bit error rate compared
to qubit-based systems [12].
High-dimensional QKD systems have been demon-
strated using various degrees-of-freedom of the pho-
ton, such as spatial [13–17] or time-energy modes [18–
23]. Here, we use the photon’s temporal degree-of-
freedom because it is relatively unaffected by turbu-
lence in a free-space channel and easily propagates
through metropolitan-scale fiber networks. Using a four-
dimensional (d = 4) state space represented by four
distinct time bins and its conjugate state space in the
Fourier transform domain, we realize a QKD that gener-
ates and ultra-high secret key rate. We note that our sys-
tem is built using commercial off-the-shelf components,
and therefore it can readily be realized using equipment
found in many existing QKD systems.
RESULTS
Our QKD system is based on a prepare-and-measure
scheme, where Alice randomly modulates a continuous-
wave laser and attenuates the outgoing photonic
wavepackets to the single-photon level. The photonic
wavepackets are then transmitted via an untrusted quan-
tum channel to a distant receiver, called Bob, who uses
single-photon detectors or interferometers coupled to
single-photon detectors to measure the wavepackets in
the time or phase bases, respectively. In addition, to deal
with the so-called photon-number-splitting attacks, we
use a practical decoy-state method to estimate the num-
ber of single-photon wavepackets received by Bob [24–
27]. The secret key is calculated using the sifted photon
time-of-arrival data, and the amount of extractable se-
cret data is determined using the noise level observed in
the sifted phase measurement data. An illustration of
our experimental system is shown in Fig. 1.
The quantum eigenstates in a d-dimension time ba-
sis are denoted by |tn〉 (n = 0, ..., d − 1). Each eigen-
state is represented by a photonic wavepacket of width
∆t = 66 ps, well localized to a time bin n of width
τ = 400 ps within a frame of d contiguous time bins,
as shown in Fig. 2a for d = 4. For fixed τ , the maximum
mutual information per received state between Alice and
Bob scales as (log2d)/d assuming there is no detector sat-
uration. This quantity is identical for d = 2 and d = 4,
but decreases for larger d.
When taking into account detector saturation in a
high-rate system such as ours, the rate scales as (log2d)
assuming that the state (frame) duration τd matches
the characteristic detector saturation time (e.g., detector
deadtime) and hence higher-dimension protocols outper-
form qubit (d = 2) protocols [23]. Furthermore, higher-
dimension protocols have better noise tolerance, result-
ing in a higher secret key rate as discussed below. In our
experimental implementation, we focus on d = 4.
To secure the QKD system, we use d-dimension phase
states. They are a linear superposition of all of the tem-
poral states weighted by a unit-magnitude exponential
phase factor given by
|fn〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
m=0
exp
(
2piinm
d
)
|tm〉 n = 0, ..., d− 1
(1)
and illustrated in Fig. 2a. They take the form of the dis-
crete Fourier transforms of the temporal states, have a
multi-peaked spectrum with peak spacing 1/τ and width
∼ 1/2∆t and the carrier frequency of each is shifted
with respect to the others. The phase states are mutu-
ally unbiased with respect to the temporal states in that
states prepared in one basis and measured in the other re-
sult in a uniformly uncertain outcome: |〈tn|fm〉|2 = 1/d.
The bars along the anti-diagonal in Fig. 2b represent the
experimentally determined values of these probabilities
when a state is prepared and measured in different bases.
At Bob’s receiver, a beamsplitter is used to randomly
direct the incoming quantum photonic wavepackets to ei-
ther a temporal or phase measurement device. We mea-
sure the temporal states using high detection efficiency
single-photon detectors with a temporal resolution better
than 40 ps. The detector efficiency begins to drop when
the detection rate exceeds 2 Mcounts/s due to the finite
detector reset time (Sec. 3, Supplementary Information).
To overcome this issue, we use a 1:4 coupler to randomly
direct photons to one of four detectors, allowing us to
operate at high rates occurring at lower channel loss.
A novel feature of our QKD system is the phase-state
measurement device [18, 28] as shown in Fig. 2c. Each
output of the interferometers is uniquely related to one
of the phase states. As illustrated in Fig. 2d, the relevant
time bin for observing interference is the central time bin
(time bin 3) and when a phase state |fn〉 is incident in
the interferometric setup, the central time bin emerging
from detector Dn, n ∈ {0, 3}, experiences constructive
interference from the superposition of all d wavepackets
and destructive interference in all other outputs. We use
commercial delay interferometers that are designed to be
field-deployable and hence require no active path-length
stabilization.
The security of our QKD system is derived using a re-
cently developed technique based on entropic uncertainty
relations for qudits [29, 30]. Unlike previous analyses
for high-dimensional QKD, our approach gives finite-key
bounds for mutually unbiased states and is secure against
general (coherent) attacks. To extract a secret key from
the single-photon states, we use a three-intensity decoy-
state method to estimate the single-photon statistics ob-
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FIG. 1. Schematic of the experimental setup. At Alice’s transmitter, the quantum photonic states (signal and decoy)
are created using a frequency-stabilized continuous laser (Wavelength Reference, Clarity-NLL-1550-HP) operating at 1550 nm,
which passes through three intensity modulators (only two are shown for clarity) and one phase modulator (all intensity
and phase modulators are from EOSpace). The entire system is controlled by serial pattern generators realized with a field-
programmable gate array (FPGA, Altera Stratix V 5SGXEA7N2F40C2), operating at a 10 GHz clock rate. In greater detail,
a 5 GHz sine-wave generator phase locked to the FPGA drives an intensity modulator (not shown), which creates a periodic
train of 66-ps-duration (full width at half maximum) optical pulses. These pulses pass through an intensity modulator (IM
1), which is driven by the FPGA-based pattern generator to define the data pattern for either the time-bin or phase states.
A second intensity modulator (IM 2), driven by an independent FPGA channel, adjust the amplitude of the phase and decoy
states relative to the primary time-bin signal states. Finally, the states pass through an FPGA-driven phase modulator (PM)
to encode the different phase states. The time-bin basis and the phase basis are chosen with probabilities 0.90 and 0.10,
respectively. An attenuator (ATT) reduces the level of the states to the single-photon level. An additional attenuator is used to
simulate the loss of the quantum channel. At Bob’s receiver, the incoming signals are split using a 90/10 beamsplitter (BS) to
direct 90% of the states to the temporal basis measurement system and 10% to the phase basis system. For both measurement
bases, we use commercially available superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (Quantum Opus) and the detection
events are recorded with a 50-ps-resolution time-to-digital converter (Agilent, Acqiris U1051A), which is synchronized with
Alice’s clock over a public channel.
served in the data. We thereby obtain a bound on the
extractable secret key length in terms of the measured
data as quantified by Eq. 2 in the Methods section.
Incorporating all of our experimental and theoretical
tools, we realize a QKD system that is capable of gen-
erating record-high secret key rates. Our achieved se-
cret key rate as a function of channel loss is shown in
Fig. 3a. For comparison to previous studies (Table I), we
also represent the channel loss in terms of an equivalent
length of optical fiber at telecommunication wavelengths
(0.2 dB/km). At a channel loss of 4 dB (equivalent to
a 20 km long optical fiber), we are able to achieve a se-
cret key rate of 26.2 Mbits/s, which is the highest secret
key rate reported at this quantum channel loss. For this
case, the error rate in the temporal and frequency bases
is 4.5% and 4.8%, respectively, as shown in Fig. 3b. We
also obtain record-high secret key rates for other channel
conditions up to to a loss of 16.6 dB (83 km) as illustrated
in Table I.
The solid curve in Fig. 3a is the simulated secret key
rate obtained using experimentally observed parameters
(see Methods). At the highest channel loss considered
in the experiment (16.6 dB, 83 km), the detection rate
is low enough that the detectors operate at their high-
est detection efficiency (> 70%). As the loss decreases,
the detectors experience increasingly lower detection ef-
ficiency because of the finite detector reset time. To ac-
count for this, we characterize the efficiency as a function
of detection rate and incorporate this information in the
security analysis (Sec. 3, Supplementary Information).
From the simulation, we see that the secret key rate
drops rapidly beyond a loss of 18 dB (90 km). This drop
mainly occurs due to finite-key effects arising from our
use of a fixed data collection interval for all data points.
In this case, the total data received by Bob goes down
for higher channel loss, which increases the statistical
uncertainty about the phase error rate (see Methods).
DISCUSSION
We are able to obtain such high secret key rates due to
multiple factors. First, for low-loss channels, the rate
is ultimately limited by detector saturation. A high-
dimensional protocol such as ours allows us to extract
more bits per received photon at detector saturation in
comparison to a qubit (d = 2) protocol, essentially dou-
bling the secret key rate for our d = 4 protocol. Second,
we use high-efficiency superconducting nanowire detec-
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FIG. 2. Time-bin and phase states for d = 4 and the phase- state measurement scheme. a, Temporal (left panel)
and phase (right panel) states for d = 4 with the phases determined from Eq. 1. b, Probability of detection when each input
state is measured in both bases. c, Measuring the phase states with a cascaded interferometric tree, where the relative time
delay of the first unequal-path delay-line interferometer (DI 1) is twice the delay of DI 2 and DI 3. The phase of DI 3 is set
to pi/2. d, Expected photon probability distribution at the output of the interferometers when the phase state |f0〉 is injected
into the system.
tors that have a relatively short reset-time in comparison
to other detectors operating in the telecommunication
band, such as Geiger-mode avalanche photodiodes [31].
Third, our detectors have nearly constant jitter (< 40 ps)
and low dark counts (100-200 counts/s) independent of
detection rate, resulting in a nearly constant quantum bit
error rate as a function of loss seen in Fig. 3b. Fourth,
we match τ to be only somewhat larger than the detector
jitter, allowing us to run at a high system clock rate of
2.5 GHz.
Our time-phase-state protocol is particularly well
suited for field deployment because optical turbulence in
free-space channels does not cause scattering of one of our
photonic states into another as long as the wavepacket
duration is substantially longer than 10 ps for path
lengths of 10’s of kilometers [32]. Also, in a fiber-based
system, the typical dephasing time is substantially longer
than our frame duration time τd.
There are several possible directions for increasing the
secret key rates in our system. One is developing mono-
lithic (possibly chip-based) interferometer trees to de-
crease the insertion loss (and hence decrease the phase
error rate) and to increase d [18, 23]. Another is to use
dense-wavelength division multiplexing methods, where
Alice uses multiple transmitters each with a different car-
rier frequency sent down the same quantum channel [33].
The delay interferometers work across the entire telecom-
munication C-band and hence it should be possible to
operate using multiple spectral channels with a single
set of interferometers. Such a system will require a large
number of single-photon counting detectors, but substan-
tial progress is underway in realizing arrays with 100’s
of detectors [34]. Finally, there is considerable ongoing
research in increasing the saturated detection rate of su-
perconducting nanowire detectors [9], which will have a
major impact on any QKD system.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sketch of Security Proof
The security of our QKD protocol is defined by two cri-
5TABLE I. Comparison of some notable high-rate QKD systems.
Protocol Loss (dB) Equivalent Secret Key Security Level
Fiber Length (km) Rate (Mbits/s)
Ref.[35] T12 7 35 2.20 Collectivea
10 50 1.09
13 65 0.40
16 80 0.12
Ref.[21] HD-QKD 0 0 7.0 Collective
4 20 2.7
Ref.[23] HD-QKD 0 0 23.0 Collective
8.2 41 5.3
12.7 63b 1.2
Our work HD-QKD 4 20 26.2 Coherent/General
8 40 11.9
10 50 7.71
14 70 3.40
16.6 83 1.07
a For definitions of collective attack and coherent attacks, we refer readers to Ref.[36].
b 43 km spool with 12.7 dB loss
teria, namely the secrecy and correctness parameters,
which we denote by sec and cor, respectively. Using these
criteria, we say that our protocol is ε-secure if it satisfies
sec+cor ≤ ε, where ε is a predetermined security param-
eter. The correctness parameter cor is typically fixed and
determined by the length of hash codes used in the error
verification step. Importantly, this choice of security def-
inition guarantees that our QKD system is composable
with any (possibly larger) cryptographic protocol, e.g.,
the one-time pad encryption protocol.
Using these results, we find that the secret key length
` is given by
` ≤ max
β≥0
b2s˜T,0 + s˜T,1[c−H(λU)]− leakEC + ∆FKc, (2)
where s˜T,0 and s˜T,1 are the number of vacuum and single-
photon detections in the raw key, respectively, and λU is
an upper-bound on the single-photon phase error rate in
terms of the observed error rate in the phase basis. The
quality of the prepared states is quantified by the overlap
parameter c := − log2 maxi,j |〈fi|tj〉|2.
During the calibration of our experiment, we measure
a lower bound on this quantity of c = 1.89 as shown in
Fig. 2d, where we plot the probability of detection matri-
ces for all input states. Specifically, we measure all eight
states in both basis and calculate the overlap of the pre-
pared and measured states. When a state is measured
in the same basis in which it was prepared, the proba-
bility should be ∼1, as indicated by the data along the
diagonal. The quantity c corresponds to the logarithm of
the maximum of the anti-diagonal elements, where the
measurement and preparation bases are different. For
ideal state preparation and measurement, the overlap is
1/4, corresponding to c = 2; however, in the experiment,
these matrix elements vary about 1/4 and we pick the el-
ement that gives the worst case estimate of c, as required
by the overlap parameter defined above.
Finally, H(x) := −x log2 (x/3) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x)
is the Shannon entropy for d = 4, leakEC is the number
of bits published during error correction, and ∆FK :=
− log2
(
32β−8−1cor
)
. The secret key length is maximized
numerically over β satisfying 4cor + 18β ≤ ε (Sec. 1,
Supplementary Information).
Phase States Detection
We describe here our method for measuring the phase
states because this system has not yet been widely dis-
cussed in the literature. The interferometric setup re-
quired to perform the frequency measurement consists
of a cascade of three interferometers as shown in Fig.2c,
where the second stage of the tree has interferometers
whose time-delay (τ) is a factor of two shorter than the
interferometer in the first stage (2τ) [28].
When a phase state |fn〉 (n = 0, 1, 2, 3) enters the in-
terferometric setup, the first 50/50 beam splitter (BS)
of DI 1 splits the wavepacket into two equal parts, with
one part propagating through a longer arm relative to
the other. The longer arm of the interferometer is set to
delay the propagation of the wavepacket by 2τ (two time
bins) relative to the part propagating through the shorter
arm. The two parts of the wavepacket then recombine at
a second 50/50 BS in DI 1, resulting in an interference
pattern at the two outputs denoted by + and −.
In the second stage interferometers, the wavepackets
propagating through the longer arms are delayed by just
one time bin before interfering with the part propagating
through the shorter arms. The expected interference pat-
6a
b
FIG. 3. Observation of high-rate secure quantum key
distribution. a, Experimentally achievable secret key rates
as a function of the channel loss for the case when the number
of signals transmitted by Alice is N = 6.25 × 1010 (100-s-
duration communication session). The orange solid line is
the simulated secret key rate. For the simulation, we set the
probabilities of sending signal, decoy and vacuum intensities
to 0.8, 0.1, 0.1, respectively. The intrinsic error rate in the
time and phase basis are set to 0.03 and 0.025, respectively. b,
Experimentally observed quantum bit error rate in temporal
and phase bases signal states as a function of channel loss.
terns, representing the probability distribution function
(PDF) of the single-photon wavepackets, when state |f0〉
propagates through the interferometric setup is shown in
Fig. 2d.
It is seen that the wavepackets emerging from the in-
terferometers occupy 7 time bins, where there is a 75%
chance that a photon is detected outside the central time
bin in each channel. The central time bin is due to the
interference of all four wavepacket peaks of the incident
state and there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the incident phase states, |fn〉 and detection events in
this time bin for detector Dn. We only use these events
in our security analysis. Except for the outermost peaks,
the other peaks are due to interference of a sub-set of the
incident wavepacket peaks. Although some information
about the incident state can be extracted from measure-
ment of photons in these peaks, we do not consider this
here.
A detailed analysis reveals that the sifting process
ensures that there is no increase in error rate due to
the spill-over of these wavepackets into the neighboring
frames. However, the lower probability for a detection
event in the central time bin reduces the overall number
of events used in our security analysis and hence lowers
our secret key rate. On the other hand, the higher-
dimension protocol used here has higher noise tolerance
and allows for a higher secure rate [36].
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